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The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran 
Witold Rodkiewicz, Szymon Kardaś
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, Chi-
na, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 
14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna 
Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to 
bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of interna-
tional sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and 
the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to 
this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. 
Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and 
especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s 
ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be 
reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in 
the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, 
both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible 
lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate  benefits owing 
to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of 
sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, 
in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences 
for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian 
upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are es-
sential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices. 
Russian interests concerning Iran
Russia’s policy towards Iran has so far been 
based on two fundamental assumptions. 
Firstly, Moscow has viewed Iran as being 
a pragmatic and loyal, if difficult, partner in 
the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia, and as being a valuable geopolitical ally in 
the Middle East. With all the ideological differ-
ences between the Russian authoritarian regime 
and the Iranian Shia theocracy, these two coun-
tries had ideological opponents in common, 
namely the liberal West – with the United States 
at the forefront – and Sunni fundamentalism. 
The Russian political establishment appreciated 
the moderation that they believed was being 
demonstrated by Iran in the post-Soviet area 
in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st 
century1. From Moscow’s point of view, Teheran 
has behaved loyally to its historic competitor to 
the north, not only refraining from any attempts 
to oust it from the areas which had once been 
in the zone of Persian dominance (the South-
1 See: M. Bratersky, ‘Otkrovenno o politike’, Indeks biezo-
pasnosti, No. 2 (97), 2011, p. 173.
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ern Caucasus and Tajikistan), but actually help-
ing it maintain and stabilise its influence there2. 
Another thing the two countries have had in 
common is their rejection of Western influ-
ence, especially any Western military presence 
in the post-Soviet area and in the Middle East. 
As a consequence of this, despite the dispute 
over the delimitation of the maritime border 
on the Caspian Sea3, Moscow has viewed Iran 
as a pragmatic and loyal partner in the region. 
In the Middle Eastern context, it has viewed Iran 
as a valuable ally, whose geopolitical interests 
coincide to a great extent with those of Russia 
– the two countries backed the Alawite regime 
in Syria and the anti-Taliban government in Af-
ghanistan, co-operated with the political-para-
military Hezbollah movement, which represents 
the Shia community of Lebanon, and they also 
both had tense relations with Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. They also had a common enmity towards 
the self-styled Islamic State. 
The second fundamental assumption of Rus-
sia’s policy towards Iran was the belief that 
the conflict between Washington and Teheran 
was unresolvable. This made Moscow view Iran 
as an important partner in its policy of con-
taining American primacy in global politics4. 
2 In the mid-1990s, Teheran helped Russia end the civil 
war in Tajikistan on conditions which guaranteed an ad-
vantage to the pro-Moscow and secularist faction led 
by the incumbent president Emomali Rahmon over the 
Islamic-democratic opposition. Teheran has also pro-
vided diplomatic and propaganda support to Moscow 
in the Islamic world in its struggle against Chechen sep-
aratism. It has consistently backed the only pro-Russian 
state in the Southern Caucasus—Armenia. For more on 
this subject see: Clément Therme, Les relations entre 
Téhéran et Moscou depuis 1979, Presses Universitaires 
de France, Paris 2012, pp. 136, 147–148.
3 Moscow wants the seabed to be delimitated along the 
so-called ‘modified central line’, while Iran insists on 
a modification that would give 20% of the seabed’s 
surface to each of the Caspian states. Furthermore, Iran 
wants the sea to be divided into national zones, while 
Russia is opposed to this. Y. Y. Belobrov, A.G. Volo-
din, N.I. Kozyrev, Y.V. Lankin, V.I. Sazhin, V.I. Yurtayev, 
‘Novaya povestka dnia rossiysko-iranskich otnosheniy, 
Sovremennyie rossiysko-iranskiye otnosheniya: vyzovy 
i vozmozhnosti’, Rabochaya tetrad RSMD, no. XIV (2014), 
pp. 41–42. 
4 This topic was raised in an interview given by President 
Vladimir Putin to the Iranian news agency IRNA during 
his visit to Teheran on 16 October 2007, http://www.
kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24603
It also allowed it to use its relations with Iran 
to strengthen its position in dealing with the 
United States and to be engaged with it in 
a variety of geopolitical bargaining. As part of 
this bargaining Moscow offered modifications 
of its policy towards Teheran in exchange for 
Washington respecting its interests, for exam-
ple in the CIS area. In this context, the Iranian 
nuclear programme, which Washington sees as 
a primary threat to US interests, offered Mos-
cow an excellent opportunity to play this game5. 
Although Russia had no interest in Teheran having 
nuclear weapons, unlike Washington it did not 
treat the blocking of Iran’s nuclear ambitions as 
an absolute priority, and probably believed that 
it would be futile in the longer term perspective6. 
Therefore, Russian policy with regard to the 
Iranian nuclear programme was a projection 
of a number of goals Russia had been trying 
to achieve. The most important of these goals 
was – contrary to official declarations – to keep 
the dispute over the Iranian nuclear programme 
unresolved7. On the one hand, Russia consist-
ently defended Iran’s right to have a full nucle-
5 This has also been noticed by Russian experts. See, for 
example: N. Kozhanov, Understanding the Revitalization 
of Russian-Iranian Relations, Carnegie Moscow Center, 
May 2015, pp. 4–5.
6 “We in Moscow see little hope in stopping Iran if it is 
dead-set on building a bomb. If a nation with 70 mil-
lion people, 2,500 years of continuous statehood… and 
sufficient technical expertise really wants to go nuclear, 
it will.” Dmitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, Iran. 
A View from Moscow, Carnegie Moscow Center 2010, p. 5.
7 As Russian analysts wrote in 2011, “But in fact, Russia is 
actually quite happy with the existing situation in Iran. 
In this state of neither peace nor war, Russia is actively 
involved in the negotiating process. This offers an op-
portunity for the Kremlin to raise the stakes in its bilat-
eral dialogue with the United States, which is far more 
important to it than relations with Iran. Russia wants to 
keep the situation from degenerating into war, but nei-
ther would it welcome full reconciliation between Iran 
and the United States.” V. Orlov, I. Trushkin, ‘The Iranian 
Nuclear Program: Dilemmas facing Russia’, Security In-
dex, No.2 (95), 2011, pp. 34–35.
Moscow viewed Iran as an important 
partner in its policy of containing Amer-
ican primacy in global politics.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 177
ar cycle (i.e. the production of fissile materials 
which could be used, following further enrich-
ment, for making a nuclear bomb) and opposed 
the imposition of any sanctions on Iran, in par-
ticular economic sanctions. On the other hand, 
Moscow in its defence of Iran was not ready 
to go as far as to risk firm retaliatory measures 
from the USA. As a consequence, Moscow was 
playing a game of obstructing or hamstringing 
US attempts to convince the UN Security Coun-
cil to impose economic sanctions on Teheran, 
at the same time suggesting to Washington 
that its opposition to sanctions rather than be-
ing absolute could be softened, but for a price. 
This tactic brought Russia a number of benefits. 
Firstly, this made it an unusually valuable partner 
for Teheran, a partner who was delaying and lim-
iting international sanctions initiated by Wash-
ington. Secondly, it forced Washington to seek 
favours from Moscow if it wanted to count on its 
co-operation or at least neutrality as regards sanc-
tions on Iran, and thus it had to take into account 
and respect Russian interests to a certain extent. 
In 2010, during Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency, 
Russia responded positively the US ‘reset’ pol-
icy8, and agreed to an embargo on supplies 
of a number of weapon categories and suspend-
ed the implementation of a contract for supply-
ing S-300 air defence systems. However, it also 
prevented the UN Security Council from impos-
ing economic sanctions which the United States 
8 Washington’s tangible moves as part of the ‘reset’ pol-
icy, which met Russian expectations halfway, included: 
reducing US engagement in the post-Soviet area (in 
particular, withdrawing from active efforts to integrate 
Georgia and Ukraine with NATO), giving up the deploy-
ment of elements of the national missile defence system 
in Central Europe (which was presented by the Barack 
Obama administration as a ‘reconfiguration’ of the sys-
tem plans, although in practice this meant withdrawal 
from a decision which had already been made to build 
a particular missile defence system and replacing it with 
plans to deploy a NATO system which had lower param-
eters), the signing and the ratification of a strategic arms 
reduction treaty (START-2) based on the parity principle, 
and the ratification of an agreement on nuclear co-op-
eration (offering Russia real financial benefits,  including 
sale of nuclear fuel on the US market). 
and the European Union had to finally impose 
unilaterally.
This game of Russia’s also prevented its re-
lations with Teheran from being straightfor-
ward. Teheran rejected Russian initiatives to 
regulate the nuclear issue on several occasions 
(in 2005–2009). These included transferring ura-
nium enrichment for the Iranian nuclear plant 
and transporting spent nuclear fuel to Russia. 
These initiatives were intended on the one hand 
at avoiding any excessive aggravation of Iran’s 
conflict with the West (and thus the need to un-
ambiguously take sides and thus spoil relations 
with the other), and on the other at making Iran 
dependent on  Russia. When these initiatives 
were rejected by Teheran, this led to Russia taking 
a firmer stance on Iran and to it supporting the 
resolutions passed by the UN Security Coun-
cil (no. 1737 of 23 December 2006, no. 1747 
of 24 March 2007, no. 1803 of 3 March 2008 
and no. 1929 of 9 June 2010) imposing restric-
tions on supplies of nuclear and missile tech-
nologies and offensive weapons to Iran, and 
also imposing sanctions on a number of people 
and institutions engaged in the Iranian nuclear 
programme9. 
At the same time, Russia took care to make 
sure that the sanctions did not affect its co-op-
eration with Iran in the nuclear sector. This 
co-operation began back in 1992, when Russia 
agreed to finish the construction of the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant, which had been start-
ed in the 1970s by Germany’s Siemens. Final-
ly, the contract with Russia’s Atomstroyexport 
9 See: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/
Washington was forced to seek favours 
from Moscow if it wanted to count on its 
co-operation or at least neutrality as re-
gards sanctions on Iran.
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(a subsidiary of Rosatom) was signed in 1995, 
and construction work lasted until September 
2013. There were recurring tense situations be-
tween Teheran and Moscow during the imple-
mentation of the project: Iran accused Russia of 
prolonging the construction process under US 
pressure, while Moscow reproached the Iranian 
partner for payment delays. Furthermore, Iran 
did not initially want to accept the Russian con-
dition under which the nuclear fuel supplied by 
Russia for the reactor had to be returned (once 
it had been used)10.
The political consequences of the deal 
The political impact of the Vienna Agreement is 
ambiguous for Russia, including both pluses and 
minuses. If this agreement is put into practice11, 
it will have a number of negative consequences 
for Russia. Firstly, when Iran’s international iso-
lation ends, this country will have significantly 
more opportunities to choose political and eco-
nomic partners and Russia will lose its position 
of being Iran’s privileged partner. Iran’s strong-
er position will spell an essential change in the 
balance of forces between Teheran and Moscow 
to the detriment of the latter. More importantly, 
the implementation of the deal will significant-
ly reduce Moscow’s ability to use its stance on 
the Iranian nuclear dossier and sanctions in its 
geopolitical bargaining with Washington. It will 
thus lose its major advantage in relations with 
Washington and the opportunity to display its 
role as a ‘necessary participant’ in the resolution 
of the most important international problems – 
something which it uses to stress its position 
as a superpower. 
10 Clément Therme, op. cit., pp. 189–198.
11 It appears that both the present Iranian leaders and 
the Barack Obama administration, and – even more so 
– Western Europe are interested in the implementation 
of the deal: both parties have invested so much politi-
cal capital in negotiating it (and its benefits for Iran are 
so obvious) that blocking its implementation would be 
pointless to them. 
On the other hand, though, the signing of the 
deal will also bring Russia some benefits, but 
these will rather be potential benefits and will 
be only partially compensate for the resulting 
political losses. Firstly, Russia may capitalise 
on its participation in negotiating the Vienna 
Agreement to improve its image as a respon-
sible global actor and a potential constructive 
partner for the West in solving major interna-
tional problems. It will thus create a more fa-
vourable atmosphere for a possible normalisa-
tion of Western-Russian relations, which have 
been seriously strained due to the Ukrainian cri-
sis, and it provides new arguments to the West-
ern supporters of pragmatic co-operation with 
Moscow who want sanctions on Russia to be 
gradually lifted12. 
The deal offers Russia an additional argu-
ment to oppose NATO’s implementation of 
the so-called third phase of the missile de-
fence shield, pointing out that the liquidation 
of the nuclear threat posed by Iran removes 
the need for the United States and NATO to 
have anti-ballistic missiles in Central Europe 
(in Romania and especially in Poland).
12 In a statement made on the day the agreement was 
signed, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sergey 
Lavrov, suggested that the “priceless experience of joint 
action” of the great powers concerning Iran should be 
used to “resolve other crisis situations”, and the for-
mer Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov directly point-
ed to the “Iranian precedent” for settling the conflict 
over Ukraine. See: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_poli-
cy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content /
id/1581404http://www.rg.ru/2015/07/22/ivanov.html; 
Iranskiy precedent i ukrainskiy uzel, http://www.rg.
ru/2015/07/22/ivanov.html
Oleg Syromolotov, the Russian deputy-minister of for-
eign affairs made a similar reference to the Iranian prec-
edent in his latest interview for Kommersant (27 July 
2015) in the context of the possibilities of co-operation 
with Washington in combating terrorism; http://kom-
mersant.ru/doc/2776797
Russia may capitalise on its participation 
in negotiating the Vienna Agreement to 
improve its image.
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The improvement of the atmosphere in rela-
tions with the West may also be used by Rus-
sia to resume its diplomatic efforts to bring 
about a compromise between Assad’s Alaw-
ite regime in Syria and the part of the armed 
Syrian opposition which is supported by 
the West. 
Paradoxically, the possible strengthening of 
Iran will make Arab countries more interested 
in Russia as a potential partner. Saudi Arabia, 
wishing to weaken the Teheran–Moscow axis, 
has already demonstrated its desire to establish 
warmer relations with Russia. The second suc-
cessor to the throne and the kingdom’s defence 
minister, Mohammed bin Salman, took part in 
the Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg and 
delivered an invitation to President Putin from 
King Salman to visit Riyadh. Shortly after this, 
the Saudi Public Investment Fund signed a let-
ter of intent with the Russian Direct Investment 
Fund, declaring it was ready to invest US$10 bil-
lion in Russia within a timeframe of 4-5 years13. 
In turn, the Russian side has declared it is ready 
to sell Iskander missiles to Riyadh14.
Finally, Russia is a member of the Joint Com-
mission (consisting of all participants of the 6+1 
negotiations) established to monitor the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the document 
and to resolve any disputes that may emerge 
between the parties. It is thus able to influence 
the process of bringing the deal into practice. 
Since the commission’s prerogatives extend to 
all issues linked to the implementation of the 
agreement, Russia has thus gained the right to 
co-decide not only on the sanctions imposed by 
the Security Council, but also on the unilateral 
sanctions adopted by the United States and the 
European Union (since the deal also includes 
provisions concerning these).
13 http://kommersant.ru/doc/2762984
14 Vice-director of Rosoboronexport Igor Sevastyanov, 
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2092045
The economic consequences: the short-
term opportunities … 
The lifting of the anti-Iranian sanctions may, 
paradoxically, bring Russia short-term econom-
ic benefits. So far, despite Moscow’s political 
readiness to develop economic co-operation 
with Iran, regardless of the sanctions and also 
despite the lack of competition from Western 
firms, trade volume between the two countries 
has been falling regularly over the past few 
years, reaching: US$3.8 billion in 2011, US$2.33 
billion in 2012 and US$1.5 billion in 201315. 
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the new 
conditions will offer Russia a chance to improve 
its trade volume indicators, and the implemen-
tation of the Russian-Iranian memorandum on 
economic co-operation signed in August 2014 
may contribute to this. The content of this 
memorandum has not been disclosed. Accord-
ing to media reports, Iran would supply oil to 
Russia (0.5 million barrels daily, i.e. around 25 
million tonnes annually16) in exchange for bar-
ter supplies of Russian goods to Iran: trucks 
and railway cars, equipment used in the energy 
sector, and agricultural products (mainly grain). 
In another variant, Russia would build eight hy-
droelectric and thermal power plants in Iran. 
The lifting of the sanctions paves the way for 
enhanced co-operation in the nuclear sector, 
especially given the fact that Moscow, which 
15 Data from the website of the Russian customs service: 
www.customs.ru
16 This might help Russia overcome increasing infrastruc-
tural impediments restricting Russian oil supplies to 
Asian markets. 
It cannot be ruled out that, given the new 
conditions, Russia will improve its trade 
volume with Iran mainly through the im-
plementation of the memorandum signed 
in August 2014.
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has until recently been Iran’s sole partner 
in this area, has a privileged position as com-
pared to other prospective investors. This will 
in particular make it possible to implement 
the contract envisaging the construction of 
two new reactors at Bushehr nuclear power 
plant signed by Rosatom in November 201417. 
Furthermore, the Vienna Agreement itself pro-
vides that Russia will co-operate with Iran on 
enriching uranium for civilian purposes and 
take part in the reconstruction of the heavy wa-
ter reactor in Arak18. 
The deal also offers a chance for exports of Rus-
sian weapons to Iran to be resumed. Although 
the new deal upholds the restrictions on weap-
on exports to Iran, which were imposed by the 
UN Security Council in 2010, exports are still 
possible on condition that contracts are report-
ed to and verified by the UN Security Council. 
Already in March this year, President Putin re-
voked the decree passed by his predecessor, 
Dmitri Medvedev, which had suspended a con-
tract for supply of S-300 air defence systems to 
Iran worth US$800 million. Russia has also an-
nounced that its will sell them to Iran as soon 
as the latter has withdrawn its complaint to the 
arbitration court in Geneva against the Russian 
decision to suspend the contract19.
In the medium term (the next five years), there 
will be no real threat to Russia’s position on the 
regional oil and gas markets connected to Iran 
coming out of international isolation. While it is 
true that Iran has the world’s largest confirmed 
natural gas deposits (around 34 trillion m3) 
and fourth largest oil deposits (21.7 billion ton-
nes)20, it nevertheless seems rather unlikely that 
17 In addition to this, an intergovernmental protocol en-
visaging the construction of eight new nuclear reac-
tors in Iran and a memorandum between Rosatom and 
the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran on enhancing 
co-operation in the nuclear power sector were signed. 
18 http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/RES2231E.
pdf (20 July 2015). 
19 http://top.rbc.ru/politics/30/07/2015/55ba5e4b9a-
79474f16ea2999; http://kommersant.ru/doc/2752221
20 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2015, pp. 6 
and 20, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Ener-
gy-economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-re-
view-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf
this potential could be used in the coming years 
on a scale that could pose a serious threat to 
Russia’s interests. 
Firstly, Iran will be unable to increase its out-
put any time soon. The sanctions have led to 
a degradation of the Iranian oil sector: between 
2011–2014 its output fell from 3.6 million to 2.8 
million barrels daily, and exports from 2.9 million 
to around 1.5 million. A return to the previous 
production and export levels will require heavy 
investments of between US$50 and 100 billion. 
Thus Teheran’s promises to increase oil exports 
by one million barrels a day (around 50 million 
tonnes annually) by 2016 are rather unrealistic. 
Secondly, the volume of Iranian oil exports did 
not pose any serious competition to Russian 
exports. Although Iran supplied oil to markets 
that are important for Russia (the European Un-
ion and Asian countries), it was in quantities far 
smaller than Russian supplies. At that time, the 
share of Iranian oil in EU imports did not ex-
ceed 7%, and thus was much smaller than the 
share of Russian oil (on average, around 30% 
in 2000–2015). Furthermore, the markets with-
in the EU which were lost while sanctions were 
in place will be difficult to regain given falling 
consumption levels. 
Thirdly, it will be a long time before Iran is able 
to export gas to Europe. The example of the 
Southern Gas Corridor (gas exports from Azer-
baijan via Turkey to the EU) illustrates that it 
takes years to negotiate the conditions of sim-
ilar supplies and to build the necessary trans-
port infrastructure. Meanwhile, Iran currently 
has neither an LNG terminal nor the adequate 
transport capacity necessary for possible exports 
using the pipeline system (it exports gas to Tur-
key via the Tabriz–Erzurum–Ankara gas pipeline, 
In the medium term, there will be no real 
threat to Russia’s position on the region-
al oil and gas markets connected to Iran 
coming out of international isolation.
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which has a total annual capacity of 14 billion m3 
and which is filled to 64%). Furthermore, many 
factors indicate that the price of Iranian gas ex-
ported to the EU via the gas pipeline running 
through Turkey would not be competitive un-
der present conditions. In 2014 in Turkey, it cost 
US$65 more than Azerbaijani gas (per 1,000 m3), 
and US$155 more than Russian gas.
… and the long-term challenges
However, in the long run the fact that Iran is 
coming out of isolation may have tangible ne-
gative consequences for Russia. 
Firstly, the likely presence of foreign companies 
in Iran may in the long term significantly raise 
oil output and export volume. According to fo-
recasts, Iran stands a chance of increasing its oil 
production level from 2.7 million barrels daily in 
June 2015 to 4.1 million (World Energy Outlo-
ok 2014) or even 4.4 million (Wood Mackenzie) 
barrels by 2025. An increase in the oil supply 
on global markets, especially given the predic-
ted significant reduction of oil consumption in 
the EU, lead to even greater price decreases, 
and this will adversely affect the Russian bud-
get. Another challenge for Russia would be an 
increase in Iranian exports to countries which 
are treated as the most promising markets by 
Russian firms (India, China, Japan and South 
Korea). 
Secondly, in the long run competition with Iran 
in the gas sector may become an even more 
serious challenge for Russia, especially if LNG 
projects are successfully launched21. The emer-
gence of Iranian LNG may restrict Russia’s share 
21 Only one LNG project has been launched in Iran so far, 
the so-called Iran-LNG project. This project, with China’s 
participation, was suspended due to sanctions in 2012. 
Plans were made to build two liquefying plants as part 
of the projects: Pars-LNG and Persian-LNG. http://www.
globallnginfo.com/world%20lng%20plants%20&%20
terminals.pdf; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2012-09-02/iran-and-china-suspend-3-3-billion-
lng-project-mehr-says. None of the reports presenting 
the results of monitoring the implementation of LNG 
projects planned to be completed within the next five 
years takes Iran into account in their specifications.
in what it sees as the largest market (the EU’s) 
and most promising (China’s). Iranian gas pipe-
lines could also be developed over the next 5 to 
10 years, thus enabling gas supplies to the EU, 
although economic feasibility will remain a pro-
blem (the price would probably still be higher 
than that of Russian gas).
Thirdly, Russian companies are unlikely to win 
a significant position in the Iranian oil and gas 
upstream sector, given the Western compe-
tition. Their financial capabilities are limited, 
and their technological competitiveness is low. 
The rather unfavourable balance of Russian 
energy firms’ activity in Iran so far does not 
help them, either. It is very unlikely that Iran, 
which even while in isolation terminated con-
tracts with Russian firms, will offer them any 
special privileges for political reasons22. 
Fourthly, Russia has thus far held a monopoly 
position in the nuclear sector, yet even here it 
should expect competition. Reports on Chinese 
plans to build two nuclear power plants in Iran 
serve as proof of this23. 
22 In 2011, Iran terminated the preliminary memorandum 
it had signed in 2009 with Gazpromneft, and an agree-
ment signed `with Tatneft was terminated in 2014.
23 http://www.oilcapital.ru/industry/271480.html (22 July 
2015).
In the long term, the expected increase 
in investments from Western and/or Chi-
nese companies in the Iranian upstream 
sector will pose a challenge to Russia.
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Conclusion and possible developments
The consequences of the Vienna Agreement 
for Russia are ambiguous. In the area of poli-
tics, the losses seem greater than the profits. 
However, Russia’s ability to sabotage the agree-
ments is minimal in a situation where both Te-
heran and Washington appear to be interest-
ed in implementing them. Any attempt from 
Moscow to sabotage these agreements would 
adversely affect its relations with both Iran and 
the United States. In a situation where Russia 
is already partly isolated by the West due to its 
aggression on Ukraine, a policy like this would 
be overly risky. Therefore, the Kremlin has cho-
sen a strategy of making the best of a bad show 
and attempting to use the agreements to im-
prove its own image rhetorically. The fact that 
the economic consequences of the deal may 
turn out to be beneficial for Russia, at least in 
the short term, can be seen as a consolation 
prize for Moscow. Even though the long-term 
consequences of the deal appear to be strong-
ly unfavourable for it, given the economic crisis 
and financial troubles, the Kremlin has no other 
choice but to opt for solutions which offer tem-
porary benefits.
